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NOTES
actions survive the death of the injured party. 19 The minority rule,
however, would separate the rules of law applicable to personal
injuries and those relating to property damage, thereby reducing
the confusion their differences create in the minds of the jury. This
may result in jury verdicts which more nearly approximate a plaintiff's actual damages.
John Ilich Jr., '62

AUTOMOBILES-FAMILY PURPOSE DOCTRINE
-NEBRASKA REJECTS EXTENSION TO THIRD
PERSON DRIVING WITH PERMISSION OF
ACCOMPANYING FAMILY MEMBER
In an action to recover damages sustained in an automobile
accident, judgment was entered on a verdict for plaintiff against
the owner of a family-purpose car and another defendant who had
been driving at the time of the accident with the permission of
the owner's minor son.' On appeal, held: Judgment against
the
2
owner reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, committed to the family

19 But cf. Finnerty v. Consolidated Tel. & Elec. Subway Co., 82 N.Y.S.2d 529
(Sup. Ct. 1948). The New York Supreme Court rejected the contention
that the minority rule was no longer applicable in the state because of
the elimination of a statutory provision to the affect that a cause of
action for personal injuries abated upon death of the injured party before
said party had recovered a verdict.
1 The accident occurred near North Bend, Nebraska, on a return trip from

2

Nevada to Illinois made with the consent of the owner, who knew that
his son was to be accompanied by two guests, including the defendant
driver. The son, who was permitted to drive the car whenever he wished,
permitted his two guests to take turns at driving, so that each of the
three could drive several hundred miles. The son, asleep in the back
seat at the time of the accident, was killed in the collision. The trial court
found the defendant driver guilty of negligence as a matter of law, and
this finding was not disturbed on appeal.
Christensen v. Rogers, 172 Neb. 31,
N.W.2d
(1961).
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purpose doctrine53 at least since 1922, 4 has applied the doctrine
consistently in a well-developed line of cases.5 In the instant case,
however, the court .has clearly limited extension of the doctrine;
the owner of a family car is not liable for the negligence of a third
party driving that car without the owner's knowledge, consent, or
direction, and not in the performance of his work, even where permission has been given by a member of the owner's family present
in the automobile at the time with authority to drive the car himself.

3

In Nebraska, an automobile is not regarded by the courts as an inherently dangerous instrumentality. See Deck v. Sherlock, 162 Neb. 86,
75 N.W.2d 99 (1956); cf. Christensen v. Rogers, 172 Neb. 31,
- N.W.2d
(1961). The owner of an automobile is not ordinarily liable for
the negligence of third persons to whom his automobile has been entrusted. See Deck v. Sherlock, 162 Neb. 86, 75 N.W.2d 99 (1956); Sutton
v. Inland Construction Co., 144 Neb. 721, 14 N.W.2d 387 (1944); Snyder
v. Russell, 140 Neb. 616, 1 N.W.2d 125 (1941). The family- purpose doctrine, however, is an exception to the general rule. "Where the head of a
family has purchased or maintains a car for the pleasure of his family,
he is, under the so-called 'family purpose' doctrine, held liable for injuries inflicted in the negligent operation of the car while it is being used
by members of the family for their own pleasure, on the theory that it
is being used for the purpose for which it is kept, and that in operating
it the member of the family is acting as the agent or servant of the

owner." Linch v. Dobson, 108 Neb. 632, 635-36, 188 N.W. 227, 228 (1922).

As to the doctrine in general, see SIMMONS, NEBRASKA AUTOMOBILE
NEGLIGENCE LAW 449-54 (1957); 5A BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE
LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 3111-21 (Perm. ed. 1954); 60 C.J.S. Motor
Vehicles § 433 (1949); 5A AM. JUR. Automobiles and Highway Traffic

§§ 591-608 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 66 at 369-71; § 102 at 681 (2d ed.

1955).
The doctrine was first applied, "by the weight of authority, in the jurisdictions where the question has been determined," in Stevens v. Luther,
105 Neb. 184, 186, 180 N.W. 87, 88 (1920), and the Court declared itself
"committed to that rule" in Linch v. Dobson, 108 Neb. 632, 635, 188 N.W.
227, 228 (1922).
5 Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. Jacobson, 168 Neb. 862, 97 N.W.2d 521 (1959)
(rule stated); Bell v. Crook, 168 Neb. 685, 97 N.W.2d 352 (1959) (doctrine
applied without descission); Barajas v. Parker, 165 Neb. 444, 446, 85 N.W.2d
894 896 (1957) (doctrine effective by stipulation); Wieck v. Blessin, 165 Neb.
282, 291-92, 85 N.W.2d 628, 635-36 (1957) (father's payment of wages to adult
son not bar to doctrine); Werner v. Grabenstein, 165 Neb. 231, 85 N.W.2d 297

4

(1957) (car owned and maintained subject to doctrine); Bartek v. Glasers

Provisions Co., Inc., 160 Neb. 794, 802, 71 N.W.2d 466, 473 (1955) (doctrine

not applicable to impute driver's negligence to owner riding as guest);

Stark v. Turner, 154 Neb. 268, 276, 47 N.W.2d 569, 574 (1951) (son operated car with father's knowledge and consent and as member of family);
Lund v. Holbrook, 153 Neb. 706, 714-15, 46 N.W.2d 130, 137 (1951) (adult
son living at home; alone in car); Thoren v. Myers, 151 Neb. 453, 456,
37 N.W.2d 725, 728 (1949) (son required to obtain permission); where
an unmarried adult son living in another state used his father's car

NOTES
About the same number of jurisdictions reject the family purpose doctrine as accept it. 6 The Nebraska Court, however, had
refused to apply the doctrine in cases where the driver, although
7
related to the owner, is not a member of his household; where an
dependent
not
is
unrelated driver lives at the owner's home but
8
surrounding
circumstances
extreme
where
upon him for support;
the use of a family car utterly deny a family purpose;" or where
10
If the owner knows or
to do so would defeat its own purpose.

during a visit to the home he had left six years before, evidence was insufficient to bring son within scope of doctrine in Piechota v. Rapp, 148
Neb. 442, 446, 27 N.W.2d 682, 684 (1947) (son had consent); Loudy v.
Union Pac. R.R., 146 Neb. 676, 678, 21 N.W.2d 431, 433 (1946) (conceded
negligence of driver imputed to non-passenger owner); Jennings v.
Campbell, 142 Neb. 354, 6 N.W.2d 376 (1942) (minor son disobeyed
father's instructions); Gorman v. Bratka, 139 Neb. 718, 298 N.W.691; 139
Neb. 84, 296 N.W. 456 (1941) (doctrine not applicable where married
daughter living elsewhere had entire use of car); Sterns v. Hellerich,
130 Neb. 251, 253-54, 264 N.W. 677, 679 (1936) (father liable for son's
gross negligence where use of car was with his consent and permission);
Roberts v. Kubik, 129 Neb. 795, 263 N.W. 143 (1935) (owner liable where
jury found son hit plaintiff with car intentionally; Carter, J., dissenting
on ground owner would be liable only for negligence, if any; not for
the criminal assault); Hogg v. MacDonald, 128 Neb. 6, 257 N.W. 274 (1934)
(doctrine not applicable where unrelated driver an employee rather than
dependent, although living in owner's household); Moran v. Moran, 124
Neb. 379, 381-82, 246 N.W. 711, 712 (1933) (father had actual knowledge
of purpose, gave permission, and evidently knew son was fast driver);
Dow v. Legg, 120 Neb. 271, 279-80, 231 N.W. 747, 751 (1930) (doctrine not
applicable where lack of consent, knowledge, and permission, and adult
son took car against express command); Galpin v. Fisher, 109 Neb. 700,
192 N.W. 205 (1923) (dictum; father knew his orders had been violated);
Linch v. Dobson, 108 Neb. 632, 188 N.W. 227 (1922) (adult son driving;
owner not present); Stevens v. Luther, 105 Neb. 184, 180 N.W. 87 (1920)
(doctrine adopted).
6See 5A BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra note 3, § 3120; PROSSER, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 66 at 369.
7 See Piechota v. Rapp, 148 Neb. 442, 27 N.W.2d 682 (1947); Gorman v.
Bratka, 139 Neb. 718, 298 N.W. 691; 139 Neb. 84, 296 N.W. 456 (1941).
Marital status, age, occupation, residence, and support are matters of
evidence for the jury. Cf. Wieck v. Blessin, 165 Neb. 282, 292, 85 N.W.2d
628, 635-36 (1957), and the cases there cited.
8 See Hogg v. MacDonald, 128 Neb. 6, 257 N.W. 274 (1934).
9
See Dow v. Legg, 120 Neb. 271, 279-80, 231 N.W. 747, 751 (1930).
10 See Bartek v. Glasers Provisions Co., Inc., 160 Neb. 794, 71 N.W.2d 466
(1955). In this case the owner was riding in the car as a guest while
her husband drove. In her action against the driver of another car for
damages sustained in an accident, the Court refused to apply the family
purpose doctrine to impute any negligence on the part of her husband

to her and thereby defeat recovery, saying: "The family purpose doctrine
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should know that he has entrusted the family car to an unreliable
dependent, the rule has nevertheless been applied. 1 Similarly, instances of disobedience to or deviation from the owner's instructions
will not ordinarily take a case outside the rule. 12
The doctrine, as applied to operation of a family car by a
member of the owner's family, was restated in the principal case, 13
but the Court reached the conclusion that liability is not to be attached to the owner for the negligence of a third person since: 14
• . . the initial permission of an automobile owner to members

of his family to use a family-purpose car does not include authority
to delegate the driving of the automobile to a third person not a
member of the family.

To extend the doctrine, the Court said, 15
solely upon the theory that automobile accidents are numerous
and injured persons should be provided a more certain means
...

does not have for its objective the purpose of defeating a claim for damages by a guest by imputing the negligence of a driver to such guest but
rather to impose upon the owner of a car being used for family purposes
the responsibility for its operation as a matter of public policy." Id. at
802, 71 N.W.2d at 473.
11 See Moran v. Moran, 124 Neb. 379, 246 N.W. 711 (1933). See also Galpin
v. Fisher, 109 Neb. 700, 192 N.W. 205 (1923).
12 See Jennings v. Campbell, 142 Neb. 354, 6 N.W.2d 376 (1942); cf. Galpin
v. Fisher, 109 Neb. 700, 192 N.W. 205 (1923) (dictum). A substantial
deviation may be sufficient to avoid operation of the rule. See Dow
v. Legg, 120 Neb. 271, 279-80, 231 N.W. 747, 751 (1930). What constitutes
"substantial" deviation has been an important issue in a number of
cases. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Booker, 217 N.C. 479, 8 S.E.2d 603 (1940) (deviation relieved father of liability); Schnebly v. Bryson, 158 Wash. 250,
290 Pac. 849 (1930) (deviation beyond family purpose); Forman v.
Shields, 183 Wash. 333, 48 P.2d 599 (1935) (deviation not beyond scope
of authority). Furthermore, "so long as the child uses the car for the
purposes of pleasure, comfort, and enjoyment, no question of deviation
arises, but only a question of disobedience of instructions." Evans v.
Caldwell, 184 Ga. 203, 190 S.E. 582, 584 (1937), quoted in Jennings v.
Campbell, supra, at 360, 6 N.W.2d at 379. Cf. Richardson v. True, 259
S.W.2d 70, 73 (Ky. 1953). See also 5A BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra note
3, §§ 3116; 3118.
13 Christensen v. Rogers, 172 Neb. 31, 33-34,
N.W.2d
(1961), citing Stevens v. Luther, 105 Neb. 184, 180 N.W. 87 (1920); Linch
v. Dobson, 108 Neb. 632, 188 N.W. 227 (1922).
14 Christensen v. Rogers, 172 Neb. 31, 34-35,
N.W.2d
(1961). The case was briefed on the family purpose doctrine in behalf
of three separate parties. See Brief of Appellant Rogers, pp. 18-40; Brief
of Appellant Wilkenson, pp. 18-36; Brief of Appellee, pp. 8-13, Christensen
v. Rogers, supra.
15 Christensen v. Rogers, 172 Neb. 31, 34,
N.W.2d
(1961).

NOTES
for recovering damages for injuries sustained .

.

. is to establish a

rule of liability based wholly on public policy and not on legal
principle.... If the negligent operation of automobiles has become
such a menace as to require the imposition of extraordinary liabilliability, it is a matter
ities which exceed the scope of common-law
16
for the Legislature and not the courts.
17
Citing only Turoff v. Burch, a divided 1931 decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals which alone supports the posi18
tion taken in the instant case, the Court neither cited nor dis-

16

Whether the "omnibus clause" of an automobile liability insurance policy
would protect an owner in the situation presented by the Christensen
case is, of course, dependent upon the particular clause of the insurance
contract involved. The Nebraska Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-534 (Supp. 1959), provides only that an
" . . . owner's policy of liability insurance: . . . (2) shall insure the
person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such
motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission
of such named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for
damages . ... " Cf. GREGORY & KALVEN, TORTS 559-60 (1959)

(quot-

ing The National Standard Policy provisions); RICHARDS, INSURANCE
§§ 174, 286 (5th ed. 1952). See also Holthe v. Iskowitz, 31 Wash. 2d 533,
_

197 P.2d 999, 1007 (1948):

" . . . a person driving another's car,

under the protection of an 'omnibus clause,' may not be the agent of
the insured owner of the car, under the family purpose doctrine." If
the third party driver's own insurance protects him only while driving
another's car with the owner's permission, an injured stranger may be
left unable to recover from an insured but otherwise judgment-proof
driver as well as the owner. See also turpin v. Standard Reliance Ins. Co.,
169 Neb. 233, 99 N.W.2d 26 (1959).
17 50 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1931), cited in Christensen v. Rogers, 172 Neb. 31,
(1961). The court in Turoff thought the
,
N.W2d
34,
extension of the doctrine to liability for the negligence of third persons
"not warranted by the great weight of authority." Turoff v. Burch, supra
at 988, citing no authority. The authorities contra are cited in both the
majority opinion and the dissent. Id. at 987; 988.
18 In addition to Turoff, the appellant-father cited Foti v. Myers, 8 So. 2d
349 (La. App. 1942); Gott v. Scott, 199 So. 460 (La. 1940), and Samples
v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337, 170 S.E. 389 (1933). See Brief of Appellant
- N.W. 2d __
Rogers, pp. 39-40, Christensen v. Rogers, 172 Neb. 31,
(1961). The Court in Christensen cited none of these, probably because,
as pointed out in the Brief of Appellant Wilkenson, pp. 35-36, Christensen
v. Rogers, supra, the family purpose doctrine itself does not prevail in
Louisiana, Benton v. Griffith, 184 So. 371, 374 (La. App. 1938), and the
Georgia Court of Appeals decision is distinguished by the Georgia court
in the opinion in Cohen v. Whiteman, 75 Ga. App. 286, 43 S.E.2d 184
(1947), which laid down a rule contrary to that of both Turoff and
Christensen. Schnebly v. Bryson, 158 Wash. 250, 290 Pac. 849 (1930), is
sometimes cited as supporting the Turoff rule, along with Zurn v. Whatley, 213 Wis. 365, 251 N.W. 435 (1933), and Harber v. Smith, 40 Tenn.
App. 648, 292 S.W.2d 468 (1956). See 5A BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra
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cussed any of an impressive number of contrary authorities. 19
It is submitted that the language of the Court 20 casts doubt
upon the validity of the entire Nebraska family purpose doctrine
which is itself recognized by the Court to be based on public policy. 2'
A rule of policy must, of course, be limited by the policy which
the rule is designed to serve. The instant case does not appear
to rest upon an evaluation of the policy underlying the doctrine,
but rather on the basis that a specific policy does not alone warrant extension of the rule. Other courts have relied on other factors.

note 3, § 3121 at nn. 91-92. But these were not cited by appellant Rogers
to the Nebraska Court, perhaps because in Schnebly the car was not
being operated within the family purpose for which it was kept, and
the Washington rule is contrary to Turoff, see King v. Cann, 184 Wash.
554, 52 P.2d 900 (1935); the doctrine has not been regarded as adopted
in Wisconsin, at least not in this connection, see 5A BLASHFIELD, supra,
§ 3120 at 71-72, and perhaps not at all, see Burant v. Studzinski, 234 Wis.
385, 291 N.W. 390 (1940), and Crosset v. Goelzer, 177 Wis. 455, 188 N.W.
627 (1922); and in Harber,evidence was insufficient to establish a family
car or a family purpose. Harber v. Smith, supra, at
-,
292 S.W.2d
at 470-71, quoting Redding v. Barker, 36 Tenn. App. 132, 230 S.W.2d 202
(1950). As to the effect of specific permission required for each use, an
element of the Harber and Redding cases, Thoren v. Myers, 151 Neb. 453,
37 N.W.2d 725 (1949), is contra.
19 See Norwood v. Parthemos, 230 S.C. 207, _
, 95 S.E.2d 168, 169 (1956):
"It is immaterial to [the application of the family purpose doctrine] that
the actual operation of the automobile was by a companion of the son
for whom it was maintained and to whom it was furnished by the defendant."; Turner v. Hall's Adm'x, 252 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1952); Atkins v.
Churchill, 30 Wash. 859, 194 P.2d 364 (1948); Cohen v. Whiteman, 75 Ga.
App. 286, 43 S.E.2d 184 (1947); Bushie v. Johnson, 296 Mich. 8, 295 N.W.
538 (1941); Eagon v. Woolard, 122 W.Va. 565, 11 S.E.2d 257 (1940); King
v. Cann, 184 Wash. 554, 52 P.2d 900 (1935); Rubel v. Weiss, 8 N.J. Misc.
269, 149 Atl. 756 (1930); Goss v. Williams, 196 N.C. 213, 145 S.E. 169
(1928); Thixton v. Palmer, 210 Ky. 838, 276 S.W. 971 (1925); Ulman v.
Lindeman, 44 N.D. 36, 176 N.W. 25 (1919); Kayser v. Van Nest, 125 Minn.
277, 146 N.W. 1091 (1914). Cf. F.D. McKendall Lbr. Co. v. Ramieri, 85
R.I. 92, 126 A.2d 560 (1956) (under family-purpose-type statute); Dibble
v. Wolff, 135 Conn. 428, 65 A.2d 479 (1949); Schreder v. Litchy, 190 Minn.
264, 251 N.W. 513 (1933). These cases represent a rather large proportion
of the jurisdictions which have adopted the doctrine. See 5A BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 3111-21.
20 See text at note 15, supra.
21 The public policy is laid out at length in Jennings v. Campbell, 142 Neb.
354, 360-61, 6 N.W.2d 376, 379-80 (1942). Cf. Linch v. Dobson, 108 Neb.
632, 188 N.W. 227 (1922), and note 10 supra. See also Christensen v.
Rogers, 172 Neb. 31, 33-34,
N.W.2d
-,
(1961): "The
family purpose doctrine . . . is a departure from the law of master and

servant, principal and agent, and respondeat superior."

NOTES
such as an owner's express limitation on driving to the family
member entrusted with the car; 22 lack of permission or consent
from the owner ;23 and absence of the family member from the automobile at the time of the accident 2 4 to reach the limits of extension
of the doctrine. Although there is no specific language to this effect
in the opinion, the decision will most likely be construed as applying
the family purpose doctrine to drivers who are members of the
family, but as requiring a showing that a third party driver
was
25
acting with the owner's knowledge, consent, or direction.
Don H. Sherwood, '61

See Costanzo v. Sturgill, 145 Conn. 92, 139 A.2d 51 (1958); Fischer v.
McBride, 296 Mich. 671, 296 N.W. 834 (1941). But see Turner v. Hall's
Adm'x, 252 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Ky. 1952): The doctrine "is a humanitarian
one designed for the protection of the public generally, and resulted
from recognition of the fact that in the vast majority of instances an
infant has not sufficient property in his own right to indemnify one
who may suffer from his negligent act. We believe the purpose of this
doctrine would be destroyed entirely if a father could relieve himself
of responsibility by specific instructions known only to himself and his
son."; King v. Cann, 184 Wash. 554, 52 P.2d 900 (1935).
23 The Nebraska Court regarded the operation of the vehicle in the Christensen case to be "by a third party with the son's permission but without
the father's knowledge or consent." Christensen v. Rogers, 172 Neb. 31,
34,
N.W.2d
-,
(1961). The problem of knowledge and
consent received considerable argument in the briefs. Brief of Appellant Rogers, pp. 32-33; Brief of Appellant Wilkenson, pp. 23-25; Brief of
Appellee, pp. 11-12, Ibid. Had the Court not adopted the rule of the
Turoff case, this issue would doubtless have become important, if not
controlling. Cf. note 16 supra. Permission has been the controlling factor
in several cases. See Mason v. Powell, 92 Ga. App. 496, 88 S.E.2d 734
(1955) (owner not liable); Dibble v. Wolff, 135 Conn. 428, 65 A.2d 479
(1949) (owner liable); Holthe v. Iskowitz, 31 Wash. 2d 533, 197 P.2d 999
(1948) (owner not liable); Golden v. Medford, 189 Ga. 614, 7 S.E.2d 236;
62 Ga. App. 229, 8 S.E.2d 531 (1940) (owner liable); Schreder v. Litchy,
190 Minn. 264, 251 N.W. 513 (1933) (owner liable); Wilde v. Pearson,
140 Minn. 394, 168 N.W. 582 (1918) (owner not liable).
24 "We believe the Thixton case [see note 19 supra] . . . extended the doctrine far enough, and in order to hold the owner liable, at least a member of the family should be present in the automobile when it is being
operated by a third party." Griffith v. Fannin, 306 Ky. 279,
-,
206
S.W.2d 965, 967 (1947). Cf. Johnson v. Brant, 93 Ga. App. 44, 90 S.E.2d
587 (1955); Mason v. Powell, 92 Ga. App. 496, 88 S.E.2d 734 (1955); Holthe
v. Iskowitz, 31 Wash. 2d 533, 197 P.2d 999 (1948); Messer v. Reid, 186
Tenn. 94, 208 S.W.2d 528 (1948); Wilde v. Pearson, 140 Minn. 394, 168
N.W. 582 (1918).
25 See note 23, supra. Cf. Piechota v. Rapp, 148 Neb. 442, 27 N.W.2d 682
(1947); Gorman v. Bratka, 139 Neb. 718, 298 N.W. 691; 139 Neb. 84, 296
N.W. 456 (1941).
22

